Introduction
Before the crisis, the countries of central and eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia (CEECCA) 1 seemed to be making rapid and reasonably smooth economic progress, following an extraordinarily deep recession after the collapse of the communist regimes. The development model of most CEECCA countries had many common features, such as deep political, institutional, trade and financial integration with the EU and significant labour mobility to EU15 countries. However, there were also substantial differences between countries, which became more notable in the run-up to the global crisis: in a few CEECCA countries catching up was generally accompanied by macroeconomic stability, but most countries of the region became increasingly vulnerable due to huge credit, housing and consumption booms, high current-account deficits and quickly rising external debt. It was widely expected even before the crisis that these vulnerabilities must be corrected at some point, but the magnitude of the corrections when they did happen were amplified by the global financial and economic crisis.
Beyond the crisis, a major question is if the crisis is likely to have lasting economic effects. This paper assesses pre-crisis growth drivers and the medium term prospects of the CEECCA region using cross-country growth regressions, which estimate -in cross-section and panel regression frameworks -empirical relationships between growth and a number of potential growth drivers.
Many papers have adopted cross-country growth regressions for CEECCA countries; see for example Schadler et al (2006) , Falcetti, Lysenko and Sanfey (2006) , Abiad et al (2007) , Vamvakidis (2008) , Cihak and Fonteyne (2009 ), Iradian (2009 ), European Commission (2009 , and Böwer and Turrini (2010) , just to mention a few more recent papers. However, all of these papers used sample periods that ended before the crisis and covered only the boom years of the 2000s, this boom proving unsustainable in many CEECCA countries. It should be emphasised that CEECCA countries have been hit harder by the crisis than other countries, and post-crisis recovery is also generally slower for CEECCA countries than in other emerging and developing economies (Bruegel and wiiw, 2010) . Making estimates for a sample period that proved to be unsustainable will obviously bias the results toward the finding of higher growth. When the sample includes mostly booming countries, the estimated relationships between growth and fundamentals are distorted. When the sample includes a large cross section of countries over a long time horizon, and the booming countries are in a minority, but are differentiated with a dummy (which is done in most of the literature), then the estimate of this dummy is likely upward biased. Therefore, even though the crisis-period data are also hardly representative of standard conditions and in most, if not all, countries the output gap turned to negative, including the bust phase of the economic cycle in the sample is inevitable.
In our paper, we attempt a comprehensive consideration of the crisis and perform extensive robustness checks of cross-country growth regressions. To this end, we extend the sample . We perform the calculations both for the precrisis sample and for this extended sample period, studying the results for different country groups, different sample periods and a number of possible explanatory variables. We aim to answer the following three questions:
• How much does the crisis alter the within-sample fit of cross-country growth regressions? We answer this question by presenting estimates for both the pre-crisis period and for the full period that also includes the crisis.
• Has growth in CEECCA countries (or some sub-groups within this region) been different from the rest of world in the sense that these countries grew more quickly than what would have been implied by their fundamental growth determinants? The literature has approached this question by studying the parameters of a dummy variable representing certain country groups in the growth regression. We perform two main tasks in examining this question: (1) We study the robustness of the estimated parameter of country group dummies in the context of the crisis. (2) For the ten central and eastern
European countries (CEE10) that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 we set up a counterfactual scenario for the fundamentals (eg capital inflows, trade integration, institutional development) under which no EU enlargement occurred, basing the scenario on the developments in non-EU middle income countries. We then use our estimated models to simulate the growth effects of the incremental improvement of fundamentals due to prospective and actual EU membership.
• How much has the crisis altered future GDP growth scenarios? The change in projections can be traced back to two factors: (1) change in the model and (2) change in the assumed path of explanatory variables. The econometric estimates provide an explanation for the first factor, and we shall formulate different scenarios for the second factor, drawing on the experience of previous crises.
We find that • The crisis has also altered future GDP growth scenarios: even in the optimistic scenario that assumes a return to the pre-crisis development of fundamentals, medium-term outlooks are below pre-crisis actual growth, especially in those countries that experienced substantial credit and consumption booms before the crisis.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses our methodology and model selection issues. The results of the growth regressions are presented in section 3. We also answer our first research question in this section. Section 4 discusses the effect of EU enlargement on the growth of new EU member states and presents a discussion of the second research question. The third research question is analysed in section 5. Section 6 presents a summary.
Methodology and model selection issues
The execution of cross-country growth regressions typically involves a large degree of discretion. One issue is related to the length of the sample period: the longer the sample, the more precise the estimate, provided that there are no structural breaks. However, the pretransition developments (when CEECCA countries operated under different economic systems) and the first years of transition (when these countries introduced market-oriented reforms and experienced extensive structural change) are not informative for current growth prospects because of significant structural breaks. Consequently, it is rather difficult to set an appropriate start date for the sample period. Figure 1 shows GDP per capita at purchasing power parity compared to the EU15 for the countries we study, in comparison to some Latin American and Asian countries from 1980-2010 (where available). Figure 1 clearly shows the extraordinarily deep recession that accompanied the first years of transition 3 , but also the quick catching-up that followed in most countries, which can partly be regarded as a kind of 'reconstruction' after the deep recession. The recession lasted just for a few years in the case of the CEE10 countries and some south-eastern European countries, but in most Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, it lasted longer. Both the recession and the reconstruction period complicate the selection of a start date for the sample period.
Another issue is whether or not the sample should include panel data at a yearly frequency, time-averaged data over non-overlapping intervals, or time-averaged pure cross-section data.
The advantage of a cross-section setup is that issues related to dynamic panels do not arise and endogeneity is less of a concern, though causality cannot be claimed, unless suitable instruments are found. It is very difficult to find suitable instruments. For example, Iradian (2009) uses a set of instruments for the reform indexes, such as the distance to Brussels, the share of commodity exports as percent of total export, and some others, but for other 3 It was widely expected that countries undergoing transition would experience an initial decline in output and employment, but the depth and the length of the post-communist recession were unexpected (Fischer, 2002; Svejnar 2006) . The literature has proposed various explanations for this phenomenon. Svejnar (2006) categorises them into six main themes. First, a disorganisation among suppliers, producers and consumers associated with the central planning; second, the dissolution in 1990 of Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), which governed trade relations across the Soviet bloc; third, difficulties of sectoral shifts in the presence of labour market imperfections; fourth, a switch from controlled to uncontrolled monopolistic structures in these economies; fifth, a credit crunch stemming from the reduction in state subsidies to firms and rise in real interest rates; and finally, tight macroeconomic policies may have played a role in the depth and length of the recession.
endogenous variables, such as fiscal balance, investment rate or inflation, he could not assemble suitable instruments. The selection of the country sample is another key issue. The very reason behind crosscountry regressions is that the countries in the sample share similar characteristics; when many countries are included, the country-specific factors or the effects of randomness on the results could be lessened. However, certain countries may have significantly different characteristics, eg the same factors may have different effects on growth in very small countries compared to major developed economies. The level of a country's development also has an important bearing on growth drivers 4 .
A further issue is the selection of variables. This can also be subject to a large degree of discretion, because there are many indicators that can be used to measure a certain factor that are more or less correlated. The actual results may be sensitive to the selection of the variables used 5 . In a seminal article, Levine and Renelt (1992) find in a growth regression framework that very few economic variables are robustly correlated with economic growth rates. They could only detect positive and robust correlation between average growth rates and two variables: the investment rate (share of investment in GDP) and trade openness (the share of trade in GDP). But they could not detect robust correlation for a broad array of other potential explanatory variables. The extensive survey presented in Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2005) broadly confirms these findings and concludes that "growth econometrics is an area of research that is still in its infancy" (p. 651).
When we have looked for a single best model, we have indeed found considerable sensitivity to the time period, the country sample and the set of variables, which is in line with the findings of Levine and Renelt (1992) . We try to overcome these issues by concentrating on sample periods that start well after the collapse of the communist regimes, studying different country samples and using various explanatory variables to form different models and study a number of combinations of them.
We use three different time periods: We use four different country samples (constrained by data availability only):
(1) all countries of the world;
(2) countries with population above 1 million; 5 Few authors acknowledge as honestly as Berg et al (1999) that results could be sensitive to model selection: "In other words, the same dataset could be used to make contradictory claims about the significance or lack of significance of various policy variables. Ad-hoc regressions of growth on a small number of policy variables, abundant as they are in the literature, thus deserve skepticism." (p52).
6 Multicollinearity among some variables may also explain the difficulties in finding a single best model. Note that multicollinearity affects the parameter estimates and their standard errors, but it does not reduce the predictive power or reliability of the model as a whole. (3) middle-income countries with population above 1 million (ie GDP per capita at PPP compared to the US between 12.5 percent and 67.4 percent, though we also add those CEECCA countries that have lower income); (4) CEECCA countries only.
Exclusion of very small countries can be justified on the basis that their economies could be less diversified and hence could strongly be affected by particular shocks related to their main business activity. The exclusion of both poor and rich countries can be justified on the basis that economic growth in countries with reasonably similar levels of development might show more similarity to one other than to much richer or poorer countries. The cut-off values indicated above were determined on the basis of CEE10 countries: we calculated their minimum (23.0 percent for Bulgaria) and maximum (56.9 percent for Slovenia) and the standard deviation, which was subtracted from the minimum and added to the maximum to determine a possible range 8 . However, we also include in this middle-income country group those seven CIS countries that have lower per capita income, as well as Mongolia, in order to be able to analyse all CEECCA countries using the same model.
Considering the variables to be analysed, initial GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) was found in the literature to be the most robust explanatory variable and we of course also include it, having found that it is indeed a robust explanatory variable. We have also considered variables that are frequently used in the empirical growth literature, such as the investment rate, trade openness, educational indicators, the dependency ratio, inflation, fiscal balance, research and development expenditures and patents.
The four key pillars of the development model of most CEECCA countries were financial, trade and institutional integration with the western world and labour mobility 9 . We have therefore employed the following variables related to these factors:
•
Capital flows: inward FDI per GDP (both stock and inflow); investment rate (gross fixed capital formation over GDP); stock and change in private sector credit/GDP.
• Foreign trade: trade openness (exports plus imports over GDP); change in the terms of trade; share of fuel and food in total exports. 8 We used the average GDP per capita at PPP compared to the US in the 2000-10 period. 9 There are clear differences within the CEECCA region, however. The CEE10 have reached the highest level of integration, followed by the countries of the western Balkans that have either EU 'candidate' or 'potential candidate' status. The six 'Eastern Partnership' countries, which were part of the Soviet Union, have reached a varying degree of integration with the EU15, while integration was generally minor for most of the other former Soviet Union countries.
• Institutional development: governance indicators complied by the World Bank; Transparency International's corruption perception index; Economic Freedom Network indicators.
• Migration: remittances over GDP
10
.
We also introduced a new variable that we have termed 'GDP historical gap' to measure the ratio of a country's comparative output, measured by its current GDP per capita at PPP compared to the US, to the country's maximum comparative output in the past. The intuition is that countries that were closer to the US at a point in time in the past may have a better chance to catch up than other countries with similar fundamentals, because catching-up in this case implies reaching a level that has already been reached in the past. This variable has a low value after a crisis, such as the economic collapse during the first years of transition. This variable is applied to all countries in the sample, not just to CEECCA countries, and is calculated for every year starting in 1980
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. Among our main country groups, the CIS countries still score low in this measure as they have not yet reached their pre-transition levels compared to the US 12 .
Because of the difficulties in finding a single best model, we adopt the pragmatic approach of running many regressions, each of which are 'acceptable' in a sense that we will discuss shortly. We then combine them. The combination of many regressions also serves as a robustness check.
We first identified potential growth drivers and correlates in the following way. We adopted the three temporal samples and four country samples discussed thus far (ie 12 samples altogether) and estimated cross-section and panel regressions, including constant and initial GDP per capita at PPP, as well as period fixed effects for the panels. We always controlled for initial GDP per capita at PPP because this variable proved to be the most robust variable in practically all cross-country growth regressions. We chose from a large number of variables and we have of course included the two variables that were found by Levine and Renelt (1992) : the investment rate and trade openness. We then added only one other possible growth determinant at a time. When a variable had a correctly signed (judged from economic principles) and significant parameter estimate in most of the 12 samples -controlling for the initial GDP per capita and period fixed effects -we regarded it as a useful candidate for the growth regressions.
The results of this exercise are shown in Table 1 . Among the 33 variables considered we have selected 13 candidates for the growth regressions. When selecting the variables we aimed for balance; that is, we do not want to over-represent any particular kind of indicator, such as institutional quality, for which many variants tend to correlate well with GDP growth. We selected seven initial conditions: GDP historical gap, secondary school enrolment, dependency rate, legal system and property rights, freedom of trade, share of fuel exports, and the stock of inward FDI. We also selected six contemporaneous correlates: fiscal balance/GDP, investment/GDP, exports plus imports/GDP, change in the terms of trade, growth in credit to private sector/GDP, and FDI inflow/GDP. The inclusion of contemporaneous correlates obviously raises the issue of endogeneity, which could be handled, for example, by properly-selected instruments. However, as we have already argued, the selection of good instruments is rather difficult if not impossible. We have reviewed many papers in the literature that could not find proper instruments. Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) demonstrated that the possible adoption of weak instruments renders conventional instrumental-variable inferences misleading. Hauk and Wacziarg (2009) studied bias properties of estimators commonly used to estimate growth regressions with Monte Carlo simulations and concluded that the simple OLS estimator applied to a single cross-section of variables averaged over time performed the best. For all these reasons we do not use instrumental variables, but apply OLS. This implies that we cannot interpret our results in a causal way (eg higher investment leads to higher growth); rather, the interpretation of the relationship as a correlation is sufficient for our purposes.
Having selected 13 potential variables, we run growth regressions with all possible quartets (ie 4-element subsets) of the 13 variables. There are 715 such quartets (13!/(4!*9!)). Our initial conditioning variable (GDP per capita compared to the US) is always included, as well as time-period fixed effects for the panels.
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In the next sections, which show our results, we report the whole distribution of the growth estimates from the 715 regressions. If the 'true 13 We note that either the investment rate or trade openness (the two robust variables in Levine and Renelt, 1992) are included in 385 of 715 regressions (and of these 385 regressions they are jointly included in 55 ones).
model' is among our estimated models and the distribution of the growth fits is reasonably dense, we may regard our result as robust. Voice & Accountability 
How much does the crisis alter the within-sample fit of cross-country growth regressions?
Following the model specification steps discussed in the previous section, we ran the 715 cross-country growth regressions for our third country sample (66 middle-income countries with population above 1 million). Figure 2 shows actual average GDP growth and the distribution of the in-sample fit derived from the 715 regressions. The distribution is presented in the form of a box-plot (see the note to the figure for details). Two sample periods are shown: the sample covering the pre-crisis 'boom years' only (2000-07) and the sample which also includes the bust (2000-10).
The main message of the figure is the downward revision of both actual growth and fitted values of growth from the regressions. For most countries the downward revision is between one and three percent per year. In some cases, actual growth fits well with the distribution of the 715 estimates, but there are outliers. We would like to highlight, however, that the goal was not find a perfect fit for all countries but to estimate models that can be used to assess the 'potential' rate of growth. The box-plot represents the distribution of the fits (point estimates) derived from the regressions. The box portion of a box-plot represents the first and third quartiles (middle 50 percent of the estimates), the median is depicted using an orange line through the centre of the box, while the mean is drawn using a green circle. The whiskers and staples ('error bars') show the values that are outside the first and third quartiles, but within 1.5 times the interquartile range (ie 1.5 times the difference between first and third quartiles). Outliers, if any, are indicated with separate symbols outside the staples. Box widths are proportional to the sample size (number of available regression).
How large is the EU accession 'growth dividend'?
EU accession can (1) directly improve the fundamentals that drive economic growth, such as higher capital inflows, higher trade flows, a better legal environment, etc, but (2) can also have a 'growth dividend' beyond the effects of enlargement on the fundamental determinants of growth. This dividend can be due to, for example, enhanced credibility, which is not captured by any other variable included in the model. To our knowledge, earlier papers that have adopted growth regressions have only considered this second factor using dummy variable approaches, which we also use in Section 4.1. But in Section 4.2 we consider as well the first factor using a counterfactual simulation.
Dummy variable approach
It is a common practice to include regional dummies in cross-country growth regressions.
When the estimated parameter of such a dummy is significantly larger then zero, one may . Regarding CIS countries, Åslund and Jenish (2006) found that these countries had exhibited extraordinary growth performances since 2000. As we have argued, these and all other estimates for sample periods ending before the crisis are likely biased upwards, because they were based on the period of fast growth covering only the boom part of the 2000s, which proved to be unsustainable for many CEECCA countries. We now study the impact of the sample period on the results.
To start, we estimated our 715 regressions as pure cross-section models for growth from 2000 till 2007 (ie pre-crisis sample) and for a longer period ending in 2010 that also includes the impact of the crisis. 
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Note. The figure shows the empirical distribution of the parameter estimates of the three regional dummies (included as four separate dummy variables for the four sample periods). See the note to Figure 2 on the interpretation of the box-plot.
Counterfactual simulation
We use another different approach to assess the growth dividend of EU accession. We set up a counterfactual scenario for the fundamentals under which no EU enlargement occurred, basing the scenario on the development of non-EU middle income countries. Among the 13 variables selected in Section 3, eight have likely been affected by EU accession: inflow of FDI, stock of FDI, credit to the private sector, foreign trade, investment, fiscal balance, freedom-of-trade index and the index for legal systems and property rights. We assume that EU accession did not have an effect on four variables: secondary school enrolment, dependency rate, share of fuel exports and the terms of trade. The thirteenth variable, GDP historical gap, is affected indirectly by GDP growth.
We have set up the counterfactual scenario for the fundamentals based on the development of 44 non-EU middle income countries 15 . To this end, we calculated the country-group average of the eight variables for the CEE10 and for the control group and assumed under the hypothesis of no EU enlargement that the change in the variables of the CEE10 compared to their pre-2000 values would have been identical to the change in the same variables of the control group. Figure 5 shows, for the group averages, the actual developments in CEE10
(blue line), the actual developments in the control group (green line), and the counterfactual scenario for the CEE10 (red line). The assumed impact of EU enlargement on these fundamentals is shown by the difference between the blue and red lines. We applied these average impacts to each individual CEE10 countries. 15 The income thresholds we applied were defined in Section 2. We did not include the four EU15 countries falling within the thresholds (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain We then use the estimated models to simulate the growth effects of the incremental improvement of fundamentals due to EU enlargement. To this end, we run two simulations for all 715 models and calculated the difference between the two simulations. The first simulation uses actual data for all variables, while the second simulation uses the counterfactual values of the eight variables, as discussed above, and actual data for the other variables. We used the models estimated in the form of panel regressions, covering three nonoverlapping five-year periods between 1995 and 2010. As the estimated parameter of the CEE10 dummy for 2000-10 did not prove to be significant, we did not include it in the model. 
Post-crisis growth prospects
Finally, we study prospects for post-crisis growth using our estimated models and by setting up hypothetical scenarios for the future development of growth drivers. To this end, we use the models estimated in a panel regression form, consisting of non-overlapping five-year intervals between 1995 and 2010 in order to include all major emerging-market crisis episodes of recent years. The models are estimated for the country sample comprising middle income countries with population of more than 1 million.
Based on the findings discussed in the previous section, we allow a country group dummy variable only for the CIS group in our estimated models. Since the parameter of the period CIS dummy declined in the second half of the 2000s and we do not want to pick this last estimate (because it may be sensitive to the effects of the crisis), we include a single CIS dummy for the whole 1995-2010 period.
For the projections, we have set up three scenarios (optimistic, pessimistic and an interim) for 2011-15, and we analyse possible growth trajectories. For the optimistic scenario, we assume that pre-crisis developments will resume, ie for most variables the average changes from 2000 to 2007 are extrapolated using the 2010 starting values. For the pessimistic scenario, we assume that capital inflows will be permanently reduced, foreign trade and domestic credit will expand only in line with GDP, the investment rate will stabilise at a low level and the budget balance will not improve after 2010. Table 3 details the assumptions behind these two scenarios. For the interim scenario, we assume that the key variables take the simple average of their values in the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. The period fixed effects (which are included in the panel regression) are assumed to be zero for 2011-15.
It is important to note that for different countries the suggested scenarios may have specific upside and downside risks. For example, for the Czech Republic, Poland or Slovakia, there seem to be upside risks in the interim scenario, given that these countries did not experience unsustainable bubbles before the crisis and therefore the optimistic scenario seems to be the realistic one. However, for some other countries, especially for the fixed exchange rate regime countries and Romania, there are downside risks in the interim scenario, because it would be unrealistic to expect that unsustainable pre-crisis developments could return, particularly as regards credit growth and the related inflows of foreign capital. In fact, given these countries' weak competitive positions, high private debt, and low policy credibility (with perhaps the exception of Estonia, which joins the euro area in 2011), the pessimistic scenario may be the realistic one with perhaps even further downside risks. Before presenting the results of the scenarios, it is important to highlight the potential implications of the recent negative output gaps. Figure 6 provides a schematic picture of actual and potential output before, during and after the crisis. The overheated economies in many CEECCA countries (see, eg Bruegel and WIIW, 2010) have led to faster actual output growth than potential growth before the crisis, and hence the actual output level has become greater than potential output. Cerra and Saxena (2008) have demonstrated that crises tend to generate a sizeable permanent loss in the level of output compared with the pre-crisis trend, and therefore the level of potential output in CEECCA countries is likely to have fallen during the recent crisis. As OECD (2010) emphasises, a crisis can impact all three major factors of production (capital, labour, productivity) and thereby can lead to a fall in potential output.
First, lower capital stock is expected due to foregone investment and the higher cost of capital can negatively affect capital deepening and hence output per employee. Second, unemployment hysteresis can affect both equilibrium unemployment and labour force participation. Third, reductions in total factor productivity (TFP) can result from sectoral reallocations from high-to low-productivity sectors, skill mismatches and lower research and development expenditures.
But it is also likely, in line with theory and empirical research, that actual output falls below potential GDP, ie the output gap becomes negative after the crisis. European Commission (2010) estimates that the 2010 output gap in the new EU member states ranges from -10.7 in Latvia to -2.1 in Poland. The growth scenarios we present consider the slope of potential output, but do not consider the possible growth-enhancing impact of closing the negative output gaps.
Figure 6: Schematic depiction of actual and potential output
We also note that variables related to vulnerabilities, such as the current account balance, external debt, or inflation, are not included in the regression because of the difficulties in addressing modeling issues related to causality, time profile and functional form 16 . Instead, our models can be interpreted as being conditioned on the average macroeconomic stability of the countries included in the panel. Since our panel regression includes 66 middle income countries, which on average had better macroeconomic stability than those CEECCA countries that experienced unsustainable developments, our projections can also be interpreted as being conditional on the achievement of this average macroeconomic stability. This factor provides an additional downside risk (even compared to our pessimistic scenario) for countries such as Bulgaria and Latvia. . When interpreting the figure, note that, similar to the in-sample fit presented in section 3, the aim was not to find a perfect fit to historical growth, but to estimate models that can capture potential growth. Note also that these countries experienced very sharp GDP contractions in the first half of the 1990s, and some above-potential growth after this period therefore may be regarded as a natural development. For example, according to our results, the three Baltic countries had already experienced above-potential growth rates in 1996-2000, but especially in 2001-05. As we know, this period (and also the first two years of the next five-year period as well) resulted in huge current-account imbalances and the build-up of massive external debt that proved to be unsustainable, and a deep recession followed. Table 4 shows, for three scenarios, the mean growth projection of the 715 models and their 95 percent range. The results suggest that even in the optimistic scenario -which assumes a return to the pre-crisis development of fundamentals and, in particular, to country-specific pre-crisis capital inflows, credit growth and trade deepening -medium-term outlooks are well 17 Note also that each individual fit and projection has its own confidence band. This finding is mainly the result of three effects. First, part of pre-crisis economic growth has likely led to the development of positive output gaps, while our models project potential growth and implicitly assume that the output gap will be zero. Second, the crisis has altered the estimated parameters of the models, and the full-sample estimate associates less benign effects with capital inflows. Third, all countries could achieve economic catching up toward the EU15 level considering the full period of 2001-10, which reduces conditional convergence-driven future growth. However, actual growth rates might exceed potential growth rates in the coming years, as negative output gaps are diminishing. This effect could, at least in part, compensate for the reduction in potential growth in the next few years.
There are only a few exceptions, where projected growth broadly equals average actual growth in 2001-05 or it is even higher: Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Kyrgyz Republic, Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic), Mongolia, Poland and Uzbekistan. Regarding Poland, actual growth may have been below potential growth in 2001-05, partly due to the aggressive anti-inflationary monetary policy that was adopted around that time. Actual growth has indeed accelerated in 2006-10, and therefore the relatively slow projected growth rate (on average, 3.27 percent per year in the optimistic scenario, which we argue is realistic for Poland among our three scenarios) may seem surprising. But Poland's fundamentals are not outstanding. For example, the investment rate is considerably lower than in most other CEE10 countries and the budget deficit is quite large in 2010 (more than seven percent of GDP), which will require more serious efforts to consolidate than in most other countries. Also, as Veugelers (2010) and Darvas (2010) highlight, Poland has some low scores in some important indicators corresponding to framework conditions of growth, such as infrastructure or the quality of the educational system. Note. Red colour line: actual annualised (compounded) GDP growth over the five-year period. The box-plot shows the distribution of the 715 fits; see the note to Figure 2 on the interpretation of the box-plot. Montenegro is not included due to a lack of sufficient data for estimation. Note that the projections for 2011-15 consider the growth rate of potential output, but not the correction of the negative output gap that likely characterised all countries in 2010 (see Figure 6 and the discussion around it). Note: the mean (numbers in bold) and the 95 percent range are shown for the fitted values and the projections.
Conclusions
In this paper, we used cross country growth regressions to study the impact of the 2008/09 global financial and economic crisis on economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia (CEECCA). We argued that results of previous related works that used sample periods that ended before the crisis might be misleading, because these papers obviously did not cover the bust phase of the economic cycle of the 2000s. However, using data only from the boom years, which led to unsustainable credit, housing and consumption booms in many CEECCA countries (but not in most other emerging and developing countries), might not be useful for forming longer-term perspectives. We extended the sample period until 2010, relying mostly on the April 2010 forecast of the IMF and the July 2010 forecast of the EIU, and used this extended sample for estimation in order to better capture both phases of the economic cycle. Even though forecasts for 2010 are uncertain and the crisis-period hardly represents a standard bust phase of a business cycle, including it in the sample period is inevitable and the addition of forecasts for 2010 might not distort the results much.
We ran cross-country growth regressions on the post-1995 sample period to minimise the chance of structural breaks and adopted three different sample periods (1995-2010, 2000-07, 2000-10) . To analyse the robustness of the results, we studied four different country samples and used various explanatory variables. We selected those possible growth determinants and correlates that significantly correlated with growth, controlling for the initial GDP per capita level and period-fixed effects, and checked that the results were robust both to the different time periods and to the different country groups used to estimate the panels. Among the variables that had a significant and correctly-signed partial correlation coefficient with growth, we selected 13 that represented different kinds of growth drivers and correlates. Due to the difficulties of selecting a single model, we estimated many models and combined them.
We estimated models with all 715 possible quartets (ie four-element subsets) of the 13 indicators and added initial the GDP per capita level and period-fixed effects to all regressions. We have used the estimated models to answer three questions:
• First, we studied the impact of the crisis on the within-sample fit of cross-country growth regressions by presenting estimates both for the pre-crisis period and for an extended sample that also includes the crisis. The fitted values lead to easily-interpretable results within sample. Comparing the 2000-07 sample to the 2000-10 sample, the downward revision of fitted values of GDP growth from the regressions is between one and three percent per year for most countries.
• Second, while previous research has found a substantial 'growth dividend' from EU enlargement in the sense that new EU members grew faster than their fundamentals • Third, we studied prospects for post-crisis growth using our estimated models and by setting up hypothetical scenarios for the future development of growth drivers. We have set up some scenarios and analysed possible growth trajectories. Even in the optimistic scenario that assumes a return to the pre-crisis development of fundamentals and, in particular, to country-specific pre-crisis capital inflows and credit growth, medium-term outlooks are below pre-crisis actual growth, especially in those countries that experienced substantial credit and consumption booms before the crisis. There are three main effects behind this finding. First, part of the pre-crisis economic growth has likely led to the development of positive output gaps, while our models obviously project potential growth and implicitly assume that the output gap will be zero. Second, the crisis has altered the estimated parameters of the models and the full-sample estimate associates less benign effects with capital inflows. And third, CEECCA countries achieved economic catching up toward the EU15 level when the full period of 2001-10 is considered, which reduces conditional convergence-driven future growth. Even though actual growth rates might exceed potential growth rates in the coming years, as negative output gaps are diminishing, policymakers have to take into account reduced potential growth rates, and focus even more on growth-enhancing economic and structural policies.
